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Abstract
This paper studies the extent to which local Federal regulation responds to the preferences of
local Congressional representatives. We use facility-level data over 1989-2005 to investigate the
causal effect of a local U.S. Congressional Representative’s party affiliation on the intensity of
EPA enforcement of Clean Air laws in their local Congressional districts. Random assignment
of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. In contrast to a
popular view that regulation is driven by regulatory capture, we find that the individual
Congressperson has a significant impact on rates of Clean Air Act inspection against local
polluting facilities. New Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives are estimated to
significantly depress inspection rates in the first year after their election.
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Parties, Politics and Regulation: Evidence from Clean Air Act Enforcement
1. Introduction
Federal administrative agencies make a variety of decisions that affect local firms and
interests. A good example is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s choice of how often to
inspect a local polluting facility for compliance with Federal pollution control laws. In this
paper, we study how these enforcement decisions respond to the preferences of local
Congressional representatives. Using data on enforcement of the Clean Air Act, we find a
striking responsiveness of local EPA facility-level inspections to the party affiliation of the local
Congressional representative (Democrat vs. Republican).
The nature and impact of political pressure on regulatory decision-making has been
widely studied in economics and political science (Stigler, 1971; Weingast and Moran, 1983;
Meier and O’Toole, 2006). Much of this literature studies the design of regulatory institutions,
trying to understand when, why and to what extent legislative authority is delegated to the
bureaucracy. We instead are interested in what influences bureaucratic decisions, given the
powers that have been vested in regulators. Such decisions may be at the policy level, including
rule making by regulatory agencies (e.g., Yackee and Yackee, 2006). However, much regulatory
discretion is “on-the-ground,” as in our case of environmental law enforcement.
The impact of political forces on local / on-the-ground enforcement of Federal regulation
has been considered in a surprisingly small set of research papers. Scholz, Tombly and Headrick
(1991) study the impact of local, State and Congressional political representatives on countylevel OSHA enforcement in New York state from 1976-85; they find that more liberal
(Democratic) Congressional representation is associated with more intensive local OSHA
enforcement. Kleit, Pierce and Hill (1998) consider the impact of State legislators on Louisiana

2

state enforcement of water pollution laws in 1993-4; they find that a local State legislator’s
membership on the Legislature’s environmental oversight committees is positively related to the
severity of plant-level penalties assigned in water-related enforcement actions. In his study on
the enforcement of Federal water pollution laws, Helland (1998) considers how local
Congressional representation on House and Senate environmental oversight committees affects
plant-level inspections in the pulp and paper industry over 1989-93; he finds that committee
membership is associated with reduced enforcement intensity while the committee member’s
environmental preference (as measured by a League of Conservation Voters ranking) favors
greater enforcement intensity.1
While these papers all suggest that preferences of political representatives are correlated
with local enforcement of Federal laws, these effects may be due to correlation between local
constituent preferences and those of their political representatives as opposed to a causal link
between the representatives and on-the-ground enforcement. That is, these papers do not address
the potential endogeneity of the political variables, with unobservables (such as constituent
preferences) potentially driving both attributes of the political representatives and enforcement
outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to investigate causal effects of political representation,
accounting for its potential endogeneity.
We gauge the preferences of the local Members of Congress using their party affiliation,
Democrat vs. Republican. Substantial literature documents that party affiliation is highly
correlated with policy preferences and voting behavior of Congressional representatives (Besley
and Case, 2003; Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2004). Lee et al. (2004) find that not only does party
affiliation drive Congressional voting behavior (so that voters elect policies), but that margins of
1

There are much larger literatures on Congressional politics and overall environmental policy (e.g., Shipan and Lowry, 2001)
and the “race to the bottom” in local environmental regulation (e.g., Konisky, 2007). We focus instead on how Congressmen
affect “on the ground” / “street level” enforcement of Federal clean air laws.
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victory have negligible effects on this behavior (so that voters do not affect policies per se). List
and Sturm (2006) document a counterpoint to these results by showing that electoral incentives
are important in driving politicians’ choice of secondary policies – environmental spending in
particular. However, their results do not suggest that party affiliation is unimportant as an
indicator of policy preference. Indeed, Fredriksson, Wang and Mamun (2011) find that electoral
incentives drive re-electable governors to the middle in determining natural resource spending,
but that lame-duck governors exhibit significant party-related preferences for this spending.
Overall, this research suggests that party affiliation is a good indicator of a Congressperson’s
policy preferences. Our question is: Do these preferences also play a role in driving bureaucratic
decision-making in a Congressperson’s district?
The central econometric challenge concerns the potential endogeneity of electoral
outcomes, the issue that preoccupies the modern literature on effects of political parties (e.g.,
Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004; Lee, 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Fredriksson, Wang and
Mamun, 2011; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). These papers exploit a Regression Discontinuity
design to identify impacts of party affiliation on policy outcomes. We borrow this approach by
focusing on regulatory outcomes in districts that had close Congressional elections. In close
elections, random events (such as bad weather that is well known to favor Republican
candidates) can tip an election in one direction or another, making the outcome randomly
assigned. However, in our data (over 1989-2005), we find that the “close election” criterion is
not sufficient to ensure random electoral outcomes (see Caughey and Sekhon, 2011, and
Grimmer et al., 2011, for related critiques). Because incumbents win with extraordinarily high
probability even in close elections, we focus on elections that are both close (with margins of
victory less than 2.5 percent) and open (with no incumbent in the running). In what follows, we
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present detailed evidence on random assignment of electoral outcomes (Democrat vs.
Republican) in the close-open data.
The close-open identification strategy focuses our study on arguably the least influential
Members of Congress, those who have just been elected to open Congressional seats. We find
that the preferences of even these brand new Congressional representatives matter a great deal
for local enforcement of Federal environmental laws.
Our empirical focus on Clean Air Act (CAA) enforcement is motivated by an extensive
empirical literature on the determinants and effects of environmental enforcement activity (see
Gray and Shimshack, 2011, for a recent survey). On one hand, governmental pressure for
environmental performance – predominantly in the form of environmental inspections and the
enforcement actions that can result from them – are consistently cited as the strongest influence
on firm managers’ choices of environmental strategies, including costly investments in staffing,
audits, and internal operating protocols (Gray and Shimshack, 2011; Khanna and Anton, 2002).
Enforcement can also ignite adverse public reaction in the media, by NGO’s, and in financial
markets.2 As a result, CAA inspection rates are of consequence to local businesses. On the other
hand, a well established result in the literature is the positive effect of environmental
enforcement on pollution prevention (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Shadbegian, 2007;
Shimshack and Ward, 2008; Gray and Shimshack, 2011). As a result, CAA inspections are of
consequence to the local environment. This dual importance of environmental inspections has
fueled an empirical literature on what drives them. For example, environmental inspection rates
have been shown to respond to local economic conditions (Gray and Deily, 1991, 1996),
2

Hamilton (1995) studies the impact of toxic release announcements on the media and stock prices. Gupta and
Innes (2011) find that environmental inspections have a positive effect on the likelihood that a firm is targeted for an
environment-related boycott or shareholder action. Innes and Sam (2008) document that firms participate in
voluntary pollution reduction programs, and adopt effective but potentially costly environmental management
programs, at least in part in order to obtain the regulatory benefit of a reduced inspection rate.
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reductions in a firm’s pollutant releases (Decker, 2005; Helland, 1998), and a firm’s participation
in a voluntary pollution reduction program (Innes and Sam, 2008).
Estimating political impacts on CAA enforcement (our purpose) is therefore important in
the narrow sense of understanding effects of pollution regulation, but potentially also in a
broader sense of understanding the political economy of regulation. While we do not focus on
the theory of on-the-ground regulation in this paper, our results have implications for crafting
such a theory from three current schools of thought: (1) the “capture school” of Stigler (1971)
and Peltzman (1976), and more recent common agency models of lobbying (Grossman and
Helpman, 1994, 1996, 2002), in which special interests capture regulators with policies and
decisions essentially up for sale; (2) the “minimal squawk” model of Leaver (2009), where
regulators seek to avoid regulated firm “squawks” that can bring a regulator’s mistakes to light;
and (3) the theory of bureaucratic choice attributable to Niskanen (1971), where regulatory
agencies bargain with legislators for larger budgets in exchange for regulatory decisions more
tilted toward legislator preferences.3 While empirical support for aspects of the first two theories
has been found in State-level regulation of telecommunications (Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007)
and public utilities (Leaver, 2009), neither admits a significant role for political preferences. At
least with respect to Clean Air enforcement, our results thus suggest relevance of an adapted
Niskanen (1971) model in which individual legislators can affect the decision-making of local
regulators. Two properties of such an adaptation are suggested by our work: (1) individual
Members of Congress have preferences over how local environmental enforcement is conducted
(favoring more vigorous enforcement, for example, because the Congressman is more proenvironment, or less vigorous enforcement because the Congressman is more pro-business); and

Consistent with Niskanen’s (1971) view, Coate (2002) identifies broad political impacts (of the party in power in
the White House or in the Congress) on Federal Trade Commission merger policy.
3
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(2) individual Members of Congress, as opposed to only the most influential Members, are of
consequence in the calculus of environmental regulators.
Both implications are potentially important for understanding the political / regulatory
process, at least in the environmental context. The first suggests policy divergence across parties
– versus Downsian (1957) policy convergence – along the environmental enforcement
dimension. Generally speaking, policy divergence is a highly debated phenomenon in the
political science literature (e.g., see Shipan and Lowry, 2001). The latter, however, focuses on
issues broadly in the public eye, whereas we study regulatory enforcement decisions that are
one-step removed from politicians and potentially, therefore, even more subject to suasion from
lobbying activity.
On the second implication, why might regulatory authorities respond to a local
Congressman’s preferences in making their enforcement decisions? One possible answer comes
from a Niskanen (1972) type model that is described in our on-line Appendix. The model
implicitly captures an on-going and repeated relationship between the EPA (the environmental
regulator) and the Congress (which authorizes EPA spending), treated as a bargaining
interaction. The EPA proposes an overall budget and an inspection rate for each Congressman’s
district in an environment where individual Congressmen want the EPA to know their inspection
preferences (in order to elicit EPA accommodations with these preferences on the inspection
margin) and do not want to convey their precise preferences over the EPA’s overall budget. The
latter motivates an EPA interest in accommodating each and every Congressman on inspection
choices, rather than only the few Congressmen on the margin between a “yes” and “no” vote on
the budget proposal. In this setting, the EPA wants to raise the likelihood of each individual
Congressman’s support for greater EPA funding by implicitly offering the Congressman a local
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environmental inspection rate closer to his or her most-preferred inspection target. This
“bargain” raises the Congressman’s incentive for a positive vote by raising the price of reversion
to a status quo budget (and EPA-preferred inspection rates) in the event that the EPA budget
proposal is defeated.

2. Preliminary Evidence
2.1 Summary Comparisons
We begin by presenting some preliminary evidence that local Congressional
representatives’ party affiliations may indeed be relevant to local environmental inspections.
Figure 1 graphs average facility-level inspections and enforcement actions under the Clean Air
Act (CAA), over our study period, for facilities in two types of areas. The first has all
Democratic Congressional representatives (the two Senators and one Representative), and the
second has all Republican Congressional representatives. The Figure reveals a consistent pattern
of higher enforcement scrutiny in areas represented by three Democrats vs. three Republicans.
Perhaps this could be explained by higher average facility-level pollution in the Democratic
areas, which would motivate more enforcement attention to those facilities. However, this
explanation is belied by Figure 2, which shows that the same sets of facilities have higher
average toxic pollution levels (measured by toxicity-weighted releases of CAA-regulated
chemicals reported in the Toxic Release Inventory) in the all-Republican areas than in the allDemocratic areas.
Table 1 presents a second set of comparisons. Consider a change in Congressional
representation from all-Republican (3R) to two Republicans and one Democrat. Does the
addition of a Democratic representative elevate environmental enforcement and lower pollution?
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The first panel compares average (per-facility) enforcement effort and weighted toxic CAAregulated releases before and after the electoral changes in these districts. The statistics suggest
that the addition of a Democrat is indeed associated with an increase in enforcement and a
reduction in pollution. However, consider second a change in Congressional representation from
all-Democrat (3D) to two Democrats and one Republican. Does the addition of a Republican
representative reduce environmental enforcement and raise pollution? The second panel of
Table 1 gives a somewhat mixed picture of the answer. Enforcement falls after one year under
the new Congressional regime, but rises after two years; neither effect is statistically significant.
Both sets of evidence provide a preliminary clue (albeit only suggestive) that party
affiliation of local Congressional representatives – and associated preferences of these
representatives over local enforcement outcomes – may be relevant to local CAA enforcement
intensity. A more careful study of these potential impacts follows.
2.2 A Preliminary Empirical Analysis: Data
We first construct a comprehensive unbalanced facility-level panel dataset over the years
1989-2005. The time period includes both Republican Presidential administrations (from 19891992 and 2001-2005) and Democratic Presidential administrations (from 1993-2000), as well as
periods of both Republican majorities in the House of Representatives (1995-2005) and
Democratic Congressional majorities (1989-1994). The panel includes all facility-year
observations for which we have complete data. Restricted versions of this dataset, associated
with the Regression Discontinuity approach, are discussed in detail in Section 3.
Dependent Variable. Our endogenous variable measures the extent of a facility’s
regulatory scrutiny under the Clean Air Act (CAA). We use either the number of times a facility
was inspected for CAA compliance in a given year or a zero-one variable for whether or not a
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facility was inspected under the CAA. The EPA’s Air Facility System (AFS) dataset provides
each regulated facility’s yearly numbers of inspections and enforcement actions, as well as the
facility’s zip code, county, state, and primary SIC code for the industry. Zip codes are used to tie
facilities to Congressional districts and counties.4
A given facility may or may not operate continuously through our study period. Because
the AFS data only reports facilities that were actually inspected or subject to enforcement actions
in a given year, and does not otherwise indicate a facility’s operating status, we use two datasets
to determine a facility’s operating status over our study period, the AFS and the EPA’s Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI was begun by the EPA in 1988 under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA); the EPCRA requires all facilities of a
minimal size to report any releases of a large set of named chemicals to the TRI. To identify a
facility’s years of operation, we find the first and last year for which a facility is recorded in
either the EPA’s AFS data (1970-2007) or the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI, 1988-2007).
Each facility in our data is designated as operating between these year limits. A facility
designated as operating for a given year, but with no presence in the AFS for that year, is
assigned an inspection count equal to zero for that year.
Political (Explanatory) Variables. Using the U.S. Congressional Biography and the
Wikipedia website, we collected political data on the party affiliation of U.S. Representatives
from each Congressional district and U.S. Senators from each State from the 101st US Congress
(1989-90) to the 109th (2005-06). Data on electoral vote margins in Congressional elections was

4

We use information from the Missouri Census Data Center to match by zip code. A small number of facilities are
located in zip codes that fall in more than one Congressional district. To enable coherent definition of our political
variables, we omit these facilities from our data.
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obtained from the Clerk of the House.5 From data collected by Gary Jacobson, we determined
open seats (elections in which no incumbent was running).6
The central political variable of interest is a zero-one dummy variable indicating whether
a facility’s local Congressional Representative is Republican (one) or Democrat (zero). Effects
of Senatorial representation are measured by a second zero-one dummy variable indicating
whether the facility is in a State with at least one Republican U.S. Senator (one) or not (zero). 7
Other Explanatory Variables. A key determinant of inspection frequency and likelihood
is a facility’s environmental performance in the past year (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). To
measure environmental performance, we use a facility’s toxicity-weighted lagged releases of
TRI-reported CAA-regulated air pollutants. For consistency, we aggregate releases of the 170
toxic chemicals that are regulated under the CAA and reported under the TRI throughout our
study period.8 Many facilities appearing in the AFS dataset never appear in the TRI dataset,
whether because they are not required to report under the EPCRA or because they have no TRI
chemical releases. When including lagged toxic releases in our model, we therefore restrict
attention to facilities that are common to both AFS and TRI datasets. We also restrict attention to
facilities that are located in one of the 50 States of the U.S. In the merged (AFS-TRI) dataset, we
have data on 17,635 facilities with an average number of year-observations per facility of 8.6.

5

Congressional election data is available from: http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/index.html
The Jacobson data (out of U.C. San Diego) is widely used in political science research (see, for example, Jenkins
and Monroe, 2012; Carson, et al., 2010).
7
We considered a variety of other indicators for Senatorial party affiliation, including affiliation of junior and senior
Senators, respectively; qualitative conclusions and model performance are similar to those with the simple indicator reported
here. Note also that the state of Vermont, with two senators and one Congressman, has a long history of electing
“Independent” representatives, both to the Senate and the House; as these representatives caucus with the Democrats, we
count these Independent politicians as Democrats.
8
Toxicity weights can be found at www.epa.gov/oppt/rsei/pubs/toxwght97.pdf. Weighted releases are constructed
as follows. Let m (=170) be the number of CAA regulated chemicals reported in the TRI; let x i be a facility’s
release of chemical i (less than or equal to m) in a given year; and let wi be chemical i’s toxicity weight. The
6

toxicity weighted average release by the facility is then given by R =
i

m

m

w x w .
i i

i =1

i
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The total number of facilities in the AFS dataset is 84,101 and the average number of yearobservations per facility is 7.3.9
While higher levels of lagged pollutant releases can promote more inspection scrutiny, so
too can lagged enforcement actions that require follow up inspections (e.g., see Innes and Sam,
2008). Using the AFS data, we construct a lagged dummy variable for whether or not a facility
was subject to a CAA enforcement action in the prior year.
Other socio-economic and demographic variables can be important determinants of
environmental inspections. For example, Gray and Deily (1996) document the importance of
economic pressures, with larger employers in high unemployment areas subject to less
enforcement scrutiny. Per capita incomes can affect local preferences for environmental
regulation and oversight, as well as local pressure for favorable environmental conduct by local
facilities. More dense local populations can impact the sensitivity of the local public to local
facilities’ environmental performance. All of these forces can alter incentives for government
enforcement scrutiny. To capture these effects, we construct annual county-level per capita
income, unemployment rate and population density over our study period using data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Strict environmental liability statutes (vs. weaker negligence statutes) can elevate
incentives for favorable facility-level environmental performance and thereby reduce the need
for enforcement oversight. We therefore include an annual indicator for whether or not a State
has a strict environmental liability statute (using data from the Environmental Law Institute).
Finally, local environmental views of the public can also affect enforcement incentives.
For example, more “environmentalist” constituencies may either promote government

9

Due to the large number of facilities in our dataset, it is essentially impossible to tie our EPA data to firm-level
financial data available from Compustat.
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enforcement or substitute for it (the latter found in Innes and Sam, 2008, for example). We
therefore include State-level per capita Sierra Club membership.
Table 2 presents variable definitions and summary statistics for the integrated data. The
table reveals that sample TRI reporters are subject to a slightly greater number of CAA
inspections and enforcement actions; statistics for other control variables are similar across the
two datasets (AFS and AFS-TRI).
2.3 Preliminary Model and Results
Table 3 presents regression results for a preliminary model of facility-level inspection
counts (our dependent variable) using the full AFS-TRI data and treating the local Congressional
representative’s party affiliation (our treatment) as exogenous. In Section 3 – where we present
our main analysis – we consider a Regression Discontinuity approach that accounts for the likely
endogeneity of local electoral outcomes. Table 3 presents (i) count panel models that account for
individual (random) facility effects (model (1)) and cluster the errors at a State level to account
for covariation across facilities within a State and across time for each facility (model (2),
Bertrand, et al., 2004), 10 and (ii) linear models that account for individual (fixed and random)
effects and again cluster the errors at a State level.11
In all of the Table 3 estimations, both the Republican House Member dummy and the
dummy for at least one Republican Senator have negative coefficients. The Senatorial dummy is
statistically significant in all models, although only at the ten percent level in the linear models.
The House dummy is statistically significant in all but the linear fixed effects model. Estimated
10

For the first count model, we use the Poisson random effects estimator. For the second, we use the Negative Binomial in
order to avoid the equi-dispersion restriction imposed by the Poisson (but not the Negative Binomial or the Poisson random
effects models); the restriction is rejected in statistical tests. A zero-inflated Poisson (random effects) estimation did not
converge.
11
Because our data represents a sample rather than the entire population of regulated facilities, there is an arguable
preference for random (vs. fixed) facility effects (Nerlove, 1971; Greene, 2003). However, in the linear models, the
Hausman test rejects random (vs. fixed) effects. When modeling the facility effects as random, we incorporate State and
industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. In all cases, we incorporate time fixed effects.

13

proportional marginal effects of the House Republican dummy range from negative 1.13 percent
(in the linear fixed effects model) to negative 5.67 percent in the Negative Binomial (clustered).
Estimated proportional marginal effects of the Senatorial Republican dummy are much larger
and consistent across the models, ranging from negative 29.25 percent to negative 32.94 percent.
Consistent with expectations, lagged enforcement actions have a significant positive
impact on inspection intensity. Per capita Sierra Club membership and per capita incomes both
have significant negative effects on inspection counts, consistent with prior results in the
literature (e.g., Innes and Sam, 2008) and with the conjecture that environmental constituencies
serve as a substitute for environmental law enforcement. Strict liability statutes are also
associated with lower inspections, but statistical significance of this effect vanishes when
accounting for cross-observation correlation.

3. Endogenous Electoral Outcomes and the Close-Open Data
The Issue. So far, we have assumed that Congressional party affiliation (as an indicator
of the member’s preferences) is exogenous. However, it is likely that unobservable variables
drive both electoral outcomes (Democrat vs. Republican) and environmental regulation in a
district. For example, pro-environment preferences of the public may favor both Democratic
representation and greater regulatory scrutiny of environmental performance in a district.
Conversely, higher inspections may spur businesses to promote Republican candidates and
thereby tilt elections in their favor. Stated differently, one can conceive of any number of
potential omitted variables in almost any specification of our Table 3 regressions; to the extent
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these variables are correlated with our key Congressional dummy, we may expect omitted
variable / endogeneity bias.12
In view of this possibility, we seek to identify the effect of party affiliation by using a
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design that yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect,
regardless of the model specification. Following prior practice (e.g., Lee, et al., 2004: Ferreira
and Gyourko, 2009; Fredriksson, et al., 2011; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008), this is done by focusing
on facilities and districts in which the electoral outcome (Democrat vs. Republican) is randomly
assigned and therefore exogenous by construction. Sufficiently close elections presumably have
this property, with outcomes determined by random events (such as weather) that tip the election
in one direction or the other.
However, even in close elections, electoral outcomes are far from random in our dataset.
Let us define a close election as one in which the margin of victory is less than 2.5 percentage
points (so that Republican and Democratic vote shares are within 2.5 percent of those needed for
victory). For these Congressional elections, over our 1989-2005 study period, incumbents won
83.1 percent of the elections in which they were running. Defining a close election more
narrowly, as one in which the margin of victory is less than 1.5 percentage points, incumbents
won 80.6 percent of the elections in which they were running. Clearly, in these elections,
outcomes are not randomly assigned. Incumbent party affiliation is presumably driven by any
unobservables that are the putative source of endogeneity; moreover, in our data, incumbency –
even in close elections – largely determines electoral outcomes (see also Caughey and Sekhon,
2011, and Grimmer et al., 2011, for related observations).
We therefore focus instead on elections that are both close and open, that is, in which
there is not an incumbent running for office. We consider open-seat Congressional elections in
12

These might include firm compliance histories and/or preferences of other local politicians, for example.
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which the margin of victory was less than 2.5 percent – 64 elections in our sample. In these
elections, 51.6 percent (33) were won by the party holding the seat in the prior Congress. This is
about as close to a coin flip as one could hope for! The proportion of elections that were won by
Republicans is also almost identical in seats originally held by Democrats (59.2 percent of 28
elections) and seats originally held by Republicans (58.3 percent of 36 elections).
The RD Design. Regression Discontinuity (RD) designs take a variety of forms (see, for
example, Fredriksson, et al. (2011) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), for excellent discussions).
Our baseline approach is to focus only on close open data for which we have evidence that
electoral outcomes are randomly assigned, estimating a model of the form,
Yit = α + γ Cit + β’Xit + εit,

(1)

where Y is an index function that determines environmental inspections, C is the Republican
Congressional dummy (our treatment), X is an exogenous set of covariates (including State, time
and industry effects), and ε is a random disturbance. We estimate binary (Probit) and count
(Poisson) models of inspections that take the form of equation (1) (for respective index
functions) and use the close (+/- 2.5 percent) open data. These baseline results are reported in
Tables 5 and 6.
In defining the margins of “closeness,” the analyst faces a tradeoff (as one widens the
band) between efficiency and potential specification error / bias. A variety of robustness checks
are therefore performed on the baseline regressions. First, we consider models with more and
less parsimonious sets of controls (see Tables 5 and 6). Second, we consider narrower
definitions of close, with the close open data defined by no more than 2 percent and 1 percent
margins of victory (Table 7). Third, with larger margins, there is a concern that the margins
themselves (rather than the electoral outcome) may be driving results. Following Imbens and
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Lemieux (2008) and Fredriksson, et al. (2011), we estimate models of the treatment effect using
local linear regressions that add two regressors to the equation (1) model: vit (vote margin) and
vit*Cit (vote margin times the treatment dummy).13 We implement the local linear models using
both the (+/-) 2.5 percent and (+/-) 2 percent margin data, as reported in Table 8.
Fourth and finally, many RD analyses employ the control function approach that exploits
all available data and estimates the treatment effect by controlling for a flexible functional form
in the running variable, in our case the relative vote share (see, for example, Fredrikkson, et al.,
2011; Petterson-Lidbom, 2008):
(2)

Yit = α + f(sit) + γ Cit + β’Xit + εit,

sit is the relative Republican vote share and f() is a polynomial in vote share of order three, four,
or five.14 In all cases, we limit attention to open seats (for which we have random assignment at
the margin), but do not restrict the data by vote margin. The benefit of this approach is
efficiency (due to an expanded dataset); the cost is potential specification error in the flexible
functional form. A final check is the Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) control function model that
adds to equation (1) a right-side cubic polynomial in the vote margin, f(vit), and the interactions,
f(vit)*Cit.15 The control function checks are reported in Table 9.
Before turning to the regressions, we discuss the close open (+/- 2.5 percent) data, its
relationship to the overall sample, and balancing checks. This is followed with a preliminary
graphical presentation of the regression discontinuity, obtained by fitting fifth order polynomials
in vote margin on either side of the discontinuity (vit=0). Finally comes our main evidence, the
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The vote margin is defined as the difference between the Republican vote share and the Democratic vote share.
The relative Republican vote share s is the ratio between the raw Republican vote share and the sum of the
Republican and Democratic vote shares. The Congressional dummy C measures the jump at s=50, with our data
limited to open seat districts in which the Republican and Democrat were the top two vote getters.
15
When including treatment interactions (such as f(v)*C), the coefficient on the Congressional dummy (γ) measures the
treatment effect at the jump only when the running variable equals zero at the jump. Vote margins, rather than vote shares,
must therefore be used for running variable controls in these models.
14
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regression tables. In all figures and regressions, we focus on regulatory outcomes in the year
immediately after each open seat election.
The Close Open Data. Table 4 gives summary statistics for the close-open (2.5 percent)
data. There are only two noticeable differences between the close-open and full samples
(comparing Tables 2 and 4). First, average population density for the close open sample is lower
than for the full sample. Second, the close open sample draws more from the Northeast and less
from the South than the full sample. Other indicators are similar in magnitude. In both samples,
facilities are inspected, on average, approximately once per year with an average frequency of
approximately 60 percent. Unemployment rates average slightly more than five percent over the
study period. Per capita incomes are approximately $25,000 per year. Facilities are represented
in the House of Representatives by Republicans in roughly 55 percent of the cases, with a
slightly higher Republican representation in the close open data than in the full sample.
Facilities have at least one Republican Senator in roughly 70 percent of the cases.
Random Assignment. Even in the close open dataset, we find evidence that State-level
unobservables are correlated with both electoral and regulatory outcomes. Table 4 presents
summary statistics for the overall close (+/- 2.5%) open dataset, broken down by observations in
Democrat-won and Republican-won districts. If we have pure random assignment of the
electoral outcome, there should be no correlation between the Democrat vs. Republican outcome
and prior regulatory outcomes or other district attributes. Measuring the district attributes (Sierra
Club membership, unemployment, per capita incomes, etc.) with district / election level
observations, we find no evidence of correlation. We also consider local political circumstances,
including the State’s relative Republican vote share in the most recent Presidential election (as a
proportion of the two-party vote), and the party affiliation of the State’s governor, the State
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legislature, and the prior Congressman; none of these indicators is correlated with the electoral
outcome of interest. Nor is there evidence of correlation for lagged releases or lagged
enforcement actions. However, lagged CAA inspections – which are naturally measured at the
facility level – are significantly different between the Democrat and Republican won districts.
The Republican-won areas have significantly higher levels of lagged environmental inspection.
This correlation persists with finer definitions of “close” (1.5 percent margins, for example).
We expect to see significant State effects on environmental regulation for a variety of
reasons, most importantly due to the EPA’s pervasive (but selective) delegation of regulatory
enforcement to State authorities. In view of this expectation, we examine whether we have
random assignment once we net out State effects. We do this by constructing deviations of the
inspection lags from corresponding State-averages taken from our entire AFS dataset (of 84,101
facilities and 617,546 observations). Table 4 reveals no significant difference in the pre-election
inspection deviations (net of State averages) for the Democrat and Republican won districts.
In summary, once we control for State effects, we have evidence of random assignment
of electoral outcomes in the close open data. In what follows, we therefore control for State
effects when evaluating the impact of Congressional electoral outcomes on regulation.
RD Graphs. We begin with a standard graphical depiction of the treatment effect. We
present fitted values for CAA facility-level inspections (Figure 3) and lagged inspections (Figure
4) and associated 95 percent confidence intervals for varying vote margins, using estimated fifth
order polynomials on both sides of the discontinuity (vit=0), controlling for State effects.16
Figure 4 provides a visual falsification check, confirming that pre-election inspections do not
exhibit a significant jump at the winner (vit=0) threshold. In contrast, Figure 3 reveals a
significant negative jump in post-election inspections as one moves from a Democrat victory
16

In Figures 3 and 4, State effects are evaluated at sample means.
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(vit<0) to a Republican victory (vit>0). The estimated effect of a Republican Congressman – the
jump in Figure 3 – is to reduce the average number of inspections by .22 (roughly 22 percent of
the overall sample mean from the open seat data). This estimate is larger than the simple
difference at the bottom of Table 4, but strikingly similar to the analog from our main close open
regressions below (Table 6). The figures also present inspection averages, purged of State
effects, for various vote margin bins (for example, margins between -2 to 0 percent, 0 to 2, - 4 to
-2, 2 to 4, and so on); these “actuals” roughly track the fitted polynomials.
As stressed by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and others, the RD approach permits a causal
interpretation of electoral outcomes – and their effects on environmental enforcement – only at
the discontinuity between Democrat and Republican won elections. That is, Figures 3 and 4, as
well as the control functions estimations (Table 9), reveal causal effects at the zero-vote-margin
(50 percent share) discontinuity and not of vote margins / shares themselves. The shapes of the
fitted counts in Figure 3 are therefore irrelevant for inference.
Evidence from the Close Open Data. Using the close open (+/- 2.5 percent) data, our
main (benchmark) RD evidence is drawn from equation (1) models that control for a variety of
key determinants of inspection. These controls permit much more precision in measurement of
the Congressional party effect vis-à-vis the simple differences presented in Table 4, but again we
stress that the absence of other possible controls does not compromise the causal interpretation of
our treatment (the logic of random assignment). Table 5 reports results from Probit regressions
of facility-level inspection outcomes (zero if no inspections, one if positive inspections) on the
electoral outcome in the close-open elections, State dummies, and assorted covariates in different
models. Table 6 reports analogous regressions using count measures of facility-level

20

inspections.17 In the tables, more complete models (adding year and industry effects) are
presented as one moves from left to right. The most parsimonious models are the least precise,
and our most preferred models are on the far right, including time effects, industry effects, and
the full range of covariates available to us. In all models, errors are clustered at the
Congressional district level (Bertrand, et al., 2004). For each model variant, we present
estimations both with and without lagged inspections (“dynamic” and “non-dynamic,”
respectively). In the dynamic models, the lags are almost always significant, but are potentially
endogenous. To correct for this potential endogeneity, we employ a non-linear instrumental
variable approach that, following standard practice (e.g., Greene, 2003), uses lagged exogenous
data to identify the lagged inspection regressor.18
Consistent in all of these regressions is the negative effect of Republican Congressional
affiliation on environmental inspection intensity. In the binary (Probit) models of Table 5,
Republican representation is estimated to reduce the average inspection probability by between 9
and 12.2 percent, which translates into a proportional reduction of approximately 20 to 27
percent. All of these estimated impacts are statistically significant.
In the count models of Tables 6, qualitative results are similar. All models estimate
negative effects of Republican representation, effects that are statistically significant in all but
the least precise non-dynamic (left-most) model. Estimated magnitudes of effect jump
significantly when controlling for time and industry. In the more parsimonious (left-side)

Because our inspection counts contain a large number of zero’s (40.1 percent) and predominantly values less than
five (98.1 percent), we account for the count structure of the data using a Poisson model.
18
The dynamic models are estimated by two-stage-residual-inclusion (2SRI), following Terza, et al. (2008). The latter
authors show that the 2SRI approach, unlike other two-stage methods, yields consistent parameter estimates in general nonlinear models. In the binary (Probit) models, the first stage is also a Probit estimation. In the count models of Table 6, the
lagged inspection regressor is the log of one plus the lagged inspection count (reflecting the exponential functional form of
the Poisson, and following Hill, Rothschild and Cameron, 1998); the first stage therefore takes a Tobit form. However, in
estimating the 2SRI count models of Table 6, we do not reject exogeneity of the lag at any reasonable statistical level (e.g.,
35 percent or less) and therefore report uninstrumented dynamic regressions.
17
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models, the estimated effect of a Republican Congressman is to reduce inspection counts by 20
to 21 percent. In the more complete (right-side) models of Table 6, the corresponding estimated
effect is to reduce inspection counts by between 35 and 41 percent. In both statistical and
economic terms, these estimated effects are significant.
Robustness Checks. Tables 7 to 9 report a number of robustness checks on our main
estimations. Table 7 presents results from our most precise models (the last two columns of
Tables 5 and 6) using finer definitions of “close” to construct our close-open dataset. Recall that
we have defined close elections as those with a margin of victory less than 2.5 percent. In Table
7, we present our preferred models using close elections that have a margin of victory less than
two and one percent, respectively. Table 8 presents estimates of the treatment effects in local
linear regressions (where we add the vote margin and its interaction with the Republican
Congressional dummy). Tables 7 and 8 indicate that the negative effect of Republican
representation is robust to a finer definition of close elections and to controls for vote margin.
Perhaps of most interest are results from the control function approach (equation (2)),
reported in Table 9. All reported regressions employ available data from all open seat districts in
which the Republican and Democrat were the top two vote getters. We report outcomes using
different flexible functions in the relative vote share (polymonials of orders three, four and five),
different sets of controls (varying from “reduced” models that only include the treatment, state
effects and vote share variables, to “full” models that include all other available controls), nondynamic and dynamic, and Ferreira/Gyourko (2009) models that also include interactions
between vote margin polynomials and the Congressional dummy.19 In all models, the estimated

Between our “reduced” and “full” model is a “base” model that only excludes the lagged release variable. This
model is advantageous because of the large increase in observations made possible when voiding the restriction that
the facility-year be represented in the TRI. The corresponding disadvantage is the loss in precision from exclusion
19
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effect of the Republican Congressional dummy is negative. In the Probit models, the estimated
effect is statistically significant in almost all cases and takes on values similar to those estimated
in our first close-open regressions (of Table 5). In the Poisson models, the “full” models yield
similar estimates to those in the close-open regressions (of Table 6), but the other models yield
estimates that are smaller in magnitude and generally not statistically significant.
Closing Remark. We close by noting that this analysis focuses on arguably the least
powerful members of Congress, those just elected from open seats, with no Congressional
seniority or experience. We nevertheless find that these representatives have a significant impact
on local enforcement of Federal Clean Air laws in their districts. Republican representation in
the close open seats leads to an estimated proportional reduction in the local probability of a
government environmental inspection, for a given facility, of roughly 20 to 30 percent.

4. Conclusion
There are a number of different perspectives on how members of the U.S. Congress
influence regulatory behavior. The “political control of the bureaucracy” literature generally
stresses how more powerful members of Congress influence regulatory decisions about broad
policy (such as how the airwaves are regulated, the level of safety and environmental standards
for products and firms, or the imposition of trade sanctions). The influence is either exercised
for policy purposes (the purposes for which Congressional officials are elected) or for the more
illicit ends of doing the bidding for special interest groups in order to extract campaign
contributions (the “capture school” of Stigler, 1971, and others). In either case, regulators
respond to Congressional influence because Congress controls the agency’s purse strings and

of an important control; however, given evidence that lagged release is uncorrelated with the treatment in the close
open data (Table 4), the exclusion does not compromise consistency of the estimated treatment effect.
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other policy decisions of interest to the bureaucrats or their ultimate bosses in the Executive
political hierarchy (Niskanen, 1971).
In this paper, we investigate the scope for the decentralized exercise of Congressional
influence by studying how local regulatory decisions are affected by the local Congressional
representatives. Here it is not powerful Members of Congress influencing broad policy, but local
(and not particularly powerful) Members of Congress influencing local policy. For example, in a
Niskanen-type model of legislative-regulator bargaining over budgets and enforcement, each
individual Member of Congress can be important because the regulator seeks to increase the
probability that each Member supports their next budget request. This process may encourage
preferential agency enforcement decisions that curry favor with the individual Member.
Using party affiliation as an indicator for a Congressional representative’s preferences
(over environmental enforcement in our empirical example), we study the impact of these
affiliations on local EPA enforcement of Clean Air Act laws in the representative’s own
constituency. We identify a Representative’s party affiliation with a Regression Discontinuity
design that focuses our analysis on districts that have had a close election for an open seat. This
approach also focuses our analysis on arguably the least powerful Members of Congress, those
with no seniority at all. Even for these Congressmen, we find statistical evidence that
Republican affiliation of the local Congressman significantly dampens CAA enforcement
intensities for polluting facilities in the Congressman’s district. This result provides evidence for
a political-economic model in which: 1) Congressional representatives have discernable political
preferences over local environmental enforcement in their districts, and 2) the local EPA
regulators respond to these local Congressional preferences.
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In contrast, our results are hard to square with a pure lobbying model of regulatory
policy. On one hand, lobbying models seem particularly appropriate for regulatory decisions of
the type that we study because politicians are once-removed and, therefore, presumably
inoculated from any resulting political fallout. Moreover, our results do not rule out a role for
lobbying per se, as party-specific Congressional preferences may be driven by the pursuit of
campaign contributions from lobbying firms. However, because “capture school” models
account for neither the preferences of politicians, nor the mechanism by which Members of
Congress can influence local regulation, they cannot entirely explain our findings.
Politicians’ distance from local regulatory decisions also suggests that they are unlikely
to reflect secondary policy outcomes that single-issue voters would reward or penalize (List and
Sturm, 2006). As a result, the setting we study is arguably particularly appropriate to identify
underpinning preferences of the Congressional representatives. This said, our analysis does not
and cannot identify the source of Congressional preferences per se. Do Republicans simply
dislike inspections and Democrats like them? Or is there a separating political equilibrium in
which anti-inspection (pro-business) contributors and supporters favor Republicans and proinspection (pro-environment) contributors and supporters favor Democrats, and influence is
exercised in proportion to respective strengths of support? Whatever the mechanism for
polarization, our results suggest that this mechanism is important not only to broad policy, but
also to local regulatory enforcement.
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Figure 1: Facility Level Yearly Average Inspection plus Enforcement Actions in Politically Polar Areas

Figure 2: Facility Level Yearly Average of Total Toxicity Weighted Release in Politically Polar Areas
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Figure 3: Post-Election Number of Inspections
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Figure 4: Pre-Election Number of Inspections
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Note: Figures 3 and 4 present fitted values from estimated fifth-order polynomials in vote margins on either side of
the (v=0) cutoff, and associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The estimations use data from all Congressional
districts in which the past year’s seat was open and the top two vote getters were a Democrat and a Republican.
State fixed effects are included and evaluated at sample means. “Actual” data averages (controlling for State
effects) are presented for two to four percent vote margin bins (two percent for bins close to the v=0 threshold, four
percent bins for larger vote margins).
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Table 1: Impact of a Change in Political Representation on Environmental Parameters

Areas Represented by 3 Republican
Politicians
The Same Areas Represented by 2
Republican Politicians & 1 Democrat
Politician After ONE Year
Percentage Change (z stat)

Yearly Average
Inspections plus
Enforcement Actions

Yearly Average
Toxicity Weighted
Release

0.999

43,800,000

1.024

35,000,000

2.50% (7.15)***

–20.09% (-16.86)***

Number of Observations
(
Areas Represented by 3 Republican
Politicians
The Same Areas Represented by 2
( & 1 Democrat
Republican Politicians
Politician After TWO Years
Percentage Change (z stat)

57
0.985

41,900,000

1.016

35,400,000

3.15% (4.86)***

–15.51% (-10.86)***

Number of Observations

Areas Represented by 3 Democrat
Politicians
The Same Areas Represented by 2
Democrat Politicians & 1 Republican
Politician After ONE Year
Percentage Change (z stat)
Number of Observations
(
Areas Represented by 3 Democrat
Politicians
The Same Areas Represented by 2
Democrat Politicians (& 1 Republican
Politician After TWO Years
Percentage Change (z stat)
Number of Observations

107
Yearly Average
Inspections plus
Enforcement Actions

Yearly Average
Toxicity Weighted
Release

1.337

34,800,000

1.275

40,300,000

–4.64% (0.87)

25.15% (8.00)***

97

94

1.139

34,800,000

1.293

36,600,000

13.52% (1.37)

5.17% (2.94)***

183

177
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Table 2: Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable
Name

Definition

Number of yearly inspections for a
facility
Enforcement
Number of yearly enforcement actions
Actions
for a facility
CAA-TRI
Toxicity weighted CAA-regulated
Release +
chemicals reported to TRI, by facility
Sierra club membership per thousand
Sierra
individuals in facility’s state
Binary = 1 if state has a strict liability
Strict Liability
statute
Annual unemployment rate in county
Unemployment
where facility is located
Population
Population per square mile in county
Density
where facility is located ??
Per Capita
Per capita yearly income in county
Income
where facility is located (in 2000 US$)
Republican
Binary = 1 if facility represented by a
Congressman
Republican Congressman
Dummy
At Least One
Binary = 1 if facility is represented by
Republican
at least one Republican Senator
Senator
Northeast
Binary = 1 if facility is located in a
Dummy
Northeast state +++
Midwest
Binary = 1 if facility is located in a
Dummy
Midwest state +++
Binary = 1 if facility is located in a
South Dummy
Southern state +++
Binary = 1 if facility is located in a
West Dummy
Western state +++
Inspections

Source +

AFS Data
Mean (sd) ++

AFS-TRI Data
Mean (sd)++

0.986
(1.691)
0.056
(0.407)
26288
(188126)
0.002
(0.002)
0.766
(0.423)
5.380
(2.179)
827
(1981)
25614
(6427)

1.023
(2.347)
0.088
(0.573)
26288
(188126)
0.002
(0.002)
0.785
(0.411)
5.512
(1.995)
916
(1882)
25930
(6130)

US Cong
Bio

0.535
(0.499)

0.513
(0.500)

US Cong
Bio

0.722
(0.448)

0.682
(0.466)

0.159
(0.366)
0.330
(0.470)
0.422
(0.494)
0.088
(0.284)

0.180
(0.384)
0.374
(0.484)
0.382
(0.486)
0.064
(0.244)

AFS
AFS
TRI
Sierra
Club
ELI
BLS
BLS
BLS

AFS
AFS
AFS
AFS

+ AFS = Air Facility System (EPA), TRI = Toxic Release Inventory (EPA), ELI = Environmental Law Institute, BLS =
Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Cong Bio = US Congressional Biography, CAA = Clean Air Act.
++ Summary statistics are for the AFS Dataset, which does not restrict the sample to TRI reporters. CAA-TRI release
statistics use the AFS-TRI Dataset, which restricts the sample to TRI reporters (facilities that reported to the TRI one year
or more during our sample period). Number of observations = 617,546 (AFS), 151,687 (AFS-TRI).
+++ Northeast states = CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; Midwest states = IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE,
OH, SD, WI; Southern states = AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX; Western states = AK,
AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY.
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Table 3: Preliminary Regressions with Full Data
Dependent Variable: Number
of Inspections

(1)
Random Effects
Poisson
Regression

(2)
Cross Section
Negative
Binomial

(3)
Linear Fixed
Effects

(4)
Linear Random
Effects

Independent Variables

Marginal Effect

Marginal Effect

Marginal Effect

Marginal Effect

2.01x10–8
(1.22x10–8)*

1.82x10–7
(1.12x10–7)*

–9.52x10–9
(3.64x10–8)

4.42x10–8
(5.51x10–8)

Lagged Enforcement Dummy

0.084
(0.010)***

0.622
(0.038)***

0.060
(0.079)

0.329
(0.061)***

Sierra

–15.66
(2.66)***

–15.10
(7.466)**

–17.66
(5.858)***

–18.66
(8.047)**

Strict Liability

–0.170
(0.017)***

–0.088
(0.137)

–0.149
(0.137)

–0.121
(0.141)

Unemployment

–0.003
(0.003)

0.005
(0.014)

–0.011
(0.029)

–0.007
(0.023)

Population Density

5.70x10–6
(3.97x10–6)

–6.37x10–6
(12.6x10–6)

16.35x10–5
(36.36x10–5)

4.50x10–6
(10.90x10–6)

Per Capita Income

–12.40x10–6
(1.41x10–6)***

–9.37x10–6
(4.37x10–6)**

–43.90x10–6
(15.90x10–6)***

–15.30x10–6
(5.47x10–6)***

–0.047
(0.008)***

–0.058
(0.025)**

–0.012
(0.047)

–0.020
(0.011)*

State, Year, SIC dummies
Number of Facilities

–0.321
(0.010)***
YES
17,635

–0.346
(0.177)**
YES
17,635

–0.318
(0.188)*
YES
17,635

–0.336
(0.199)*
YES
17,635

Number of Observations

151,687

151,687

151,687

151,687

Lagged Release

Republican Congressman
Dummy
At Least One Repub. Senator

Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by State in Models (2)-(4). (ii) ***, ** & * respectively indicate
significance at 1%, 5% & 10% level.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Close-Open (+/- 2.5%) Data

Variable

Close Open
(AFS)
(n=5240)

Democrat-Won Republican Won
(Number of
(Number of
Observations)
Observations)

Difference
(z statistic)

Election−level
0.003
−0.001
Sierra
(37)
(−0.721)
0.730
0.0766
Strict Liability
(37)
(0.801)
5.358
0.200
Unemployment
(37)
(0.438)
693.223
−233.302
Population Density
(37)
(−1.172)
25882.29
−626.725
Per Capita Income
(37)
(−0.481)
At Least One Repub.
0.649
0.055
Senator Dummy
(37)
(0.460)
0.2778
0.0054
Northeast Dummy
(37)
(−0.511)
0.1944
0.1018
Midwest Dummy
(37)
(0.931)
0.3889
−0.1667
South Dummy
(37)
(1.472)
0.1667
0.0926
West Dummy
(37)
(0.888)
Prior (Lag) Republican
0.5676
-0.0121
Congressman
(37)
(-0.096)
0.5676
-0.0861
Republican Governor
(37)
(-0.683)
0.2703
0.0260
Republican Legislature
(37)
(0.228)
Republican Presidential
0.4844
-0.0001
Vote (Most Recent)
(37)
(-0.003)
Facility−Level
0.9908
0.8094
1.1337
-0.3243
Lag Inspections
(2.5517)
(1873)
(2378)
(-4.47)***
0.5526
0.4944
0.5984
-0.1040
Lag Inspections (binary)
(0.4973)
(1873)
(2378)
(-6.79)***
Lag Enforcement Actions
0.0424
0.0403
0.0439
-0.0036
(0.2688)
(1912)
(2573)
(-0.455)
21548
19572.5
23232.9
-3660.4
Lag CAA-TRI Release
(50506)
(556)
(652)
(-1.285)
Deviations from State Averages
0.9908
−0.0124
−0.0286
0.0162
Lag Inspections
(2.5517)
(1873)
(2378)
(0.226)
0.5526
0.0061
−0.0027
0.0088
Lag Inspections (binary)
(0.4973)
(1873)
(2378)
(0.585)
0.9790
0.0163
−0.0923
0.1087
Inspections
(1.3130)
(2306)
(2934)
(3.13)***
0.5912
0.0319
−0.0382
0.0701
Inspections (binary)
(0.4917)
(2306)
(2934)
(5.26)***
Notes: z statistics is in parentheses. ***, ** & * indicate significance at 1%, 5% & 10% level. The Close Open
data restricts the sample to observations for which the last Congressional election was open (no incumbent
running) and close (margin of victory within +/- 2.5%). + Columns (1)-(2) give statistics for current Republican
Congressman and CAA-TRI Release; columns (3)-(4) give statistics for corresponding lagged values.
Mean (sd)
0.0020
(0.0033)
0.734
(0.442)
5.074
(2.038)
371.878
(648.391)
24502.44
(5470.351)
0.695
(0.461)
0.265
(0.441)
0.325
(0.469)
0.321
(0.467)
0.089
(0.284)
0.562
(0.496)
0.531
(0.503)
0.281
(0.453)
0.484
(0.0624)

0.002
(27)
0.815
(27)
5.558
(27)
459.921
(27)
25255.56
(27)
0.704
(27)
0.2222
(27)
0.2963
(27)
0.2222
(27)
0.2593
(27)
0.5555
(27)
0.4815
(27)
0.2963
(27)
0.4843
(27)
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Table 5: Probit Model of Inspections (Binary) in Close-Open Districts
Independent Variables

Marginal Effect
(Clustered Standard Error)

Marginal Effect
(Clustered Standard Error)

Marginal Effect
(Clustered Standard Error)

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

–0.100
(0.054)*

–0.114
(0.031)***

–0.092
(0.052)*

–0.122
(0.030)***

–0.090
(0.053)*

–0.115
(0.033)***

NO

0.718
(0.020)***

NO

0.718
(0.019)***

NO

0.716
(0.017)***

Sierra

60.605
(34.777)*

59.345
(17.955)***

2.301
(6.872)

5.781
(4.152)

–3.000
(7.188)

0.836
(4.734)

Strict Liability

–0.214
(0.132)*

0.422
(0.042)***

0.212
(0.175)

–0.431
(0.067)***

–0.265
(0.172)

–0.443
(0.069)***

5.72e-07
(2.51e-07)**

–3.86e-07
(3.02e-07)

6.51e-07
(2.66e-07)***

–2.23e-07
(2.74e-07)

5.48e-07
(3.04e-07)*

–1.89e-07
(2.94e-07)

0.134
(0.061)**

0.021
(0.062)

0.107
(0.058)*

0.017
(0.060)

0.104
(0.061)*

0.023
(0.060)

–0.006
(0.014)

0.027
(0.012)**

0.029
(0.011)***

0.008
(0.010)

0.028
(0.011)***

0.017
(0.010)*

Population Density

–4.76e-05
(4.55e-05)

6.49e-05
(3.05e-05)**

–4.92e-05
(3.91e-05)

6.96e-05
(2.36e-05)***

–4.30e-05
(3.86e-05)

5.77e-05
(2.36e-05)***

Per Capita Income

–1.95e-06
(6.58e-06)

8.11e-06
(3.79e-06)**

2.44e-06
(5.31e-06)

6.11e-06
(3.53e-06)*

4,21e-06
(4.95e-06)

9.31e-06
(3.20e-06)***

–0.003
(0.125)

–0.108
(0.077)

–0.076
(0.144)

–0.280
(0.066)***

–0.122
(0.142)

First Stage Residual

NO

–1.336
(0.357)***

NO

–1.135
(0.189)***

NO

–0.290
(0.072)***
–0.996
(0.192)***

State Dummies
Year Dummies
SIC Dummies

YES
NO
NO

YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

Republican
Congressman Dummy
Lagged Inspections
(binary)

Lagged Average Release
Lagged Enforcement
Dummy
Unemployment

At Least One Republican
Senator Dummy

R2
0.13
0.26
0.18
0.29
0.21
0.32
Number of Observations
1333
1174
1333
1174
1319
1161
Dependent variable = facility-level zero-one inspection (one if at least one inspection conducted) the year after a close (within +/2.5 percent) election in an open Congressional district. Standard errors in parentheses, robust clustered (by Congressional district).
Average marginal effects are reported. The inspection lag is treated as endogenous (using 2SRI) in the dynamic models, where test
statistics for the null of exogeneity have p-values less than .001.

36

Table 6: Poisson Model of Inspection Counts in Close-Open Districts
Independent Variables

Coefficient
(Clustered Standard Error)

Coefficient
(Clustered Standard Error)

Coefficient
(Clustered Standard Error)

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

Non-Dynamic

Dynamic

–0.232
(0.209)

–0.224
(0.120)*

–0.527
(0.250)**

–0.427
(0.134)***

–0.516
(0.269)**

–0.450
(0.144)***

NO

0.974
(0.099)***

NO

0.939
(0.098)***

NO

0.892
(0.098)***

Sierra

14.940
(8.860)*

9.988
(5.844)*

16.724
(10.951)

9.431
(7.559)

–2.958
(12.886)

-1.357
(8.080)

Strict Liability

0.282
(0.464)

-15.005
(0.910)***

0.278
(1.622)

0.0373
(1.210)

0.481
(1.611)

–15.664
(1.030)***

1.33e-06
(7.03e-07)**

7.71e-07
(5.34e-07)

1.58e-06
(6.34e-07)***

8.96e-07
(5.50e-07)

1.17e-06
(4.57e-07)***

6.39e-07
(5.03e-07)

0.526
(0.170)***

0.144
(0.132)

0.429
(0.168)***

0.148
(0.134)

0.385
(0.161)***

0.167
(0.107)

–0.053
(0.048)

–0.037
(0.032)

0.051
(0.048)

0.016
(0.037)

0.035
(0.045)

0.013
(0.035)

Population Density

–20.04e-05
(17.03e-05)

5.29e-05
(12.91e-05)

–20.03e-05
(15.21e-05)

5.24e-05
(13.61e-05)

–21.03e-05
(16.30e-05)

3.65e-05
(14.62e-05)

Per Capita Income

–2.17e-05
(2.09e-05)

1.24e-05
(1.27e-05)

–5.07e-06
(17.80e-06)

1.87e-05
(1.42e-05)

–4.41e-06
(16.90e-06)

1.73e-05
(1.35e-05)

–0.122
(0.321)

–0.187
(0.294)

–0.755
(0.585)

–0.802
(0.337)**

–0.851
(0.596)

–0.886
(0.357)**

YES
NO
NO

YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

Republican
Congressman Dummy
Lagged Inspections

Lagged Average Release
Lagged Enforcement
Dummy
Unemployment

At Least One Republican
Senator Dummy
State Dummies
Year Dummies
SIC Dummies

Log Likelihood
–1770.53
–1497.65
–1709.63
–1476.01
–1635.59
–1441.83
Number of Observations
1351
1310
1351
1310
1351
1310
Dependent variable = annual inspection count (facility-level) the year after a close (within +/- 2.5 percent) election in an open
Congressional district. “Lagged inspections” = log of one plus lagged inspection count. Standard errors in parentheses, robust
clustered (by Congressional district). The inspection lag is treated as exogenous in the dynamic models, where test statistics for the
null of exogeneity have p-values of .576, .362, and .884.
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Table 7. Models of Inspections with Finer Close Open Data (+/- 2% and +/- 1%)
(A) Probit Models of Inspections (Binary)
Marginal Effect (Clustered Standard Error)
+/- 2 % Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-0.618
-0.225
(0.259)***
(0.086)***
NO
0.703
(0.022)***
NO
-0.779
(0.191)***
820
713

Repub. Cong.
Dummy
Lag Inspect
First Stage
Residual
No. of Obs.

+/- 1% Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-0.218
-0.391
(0.095)**
(0.003)***
NO
0.553
(0.124)***
NO
-0.263
(0.186)
392
332

(B) Poisson Models of Inspections (Count)
Coefficient (Clustered Standard Error)
Repub. Cong.
Dummy
Log (1 + Lag
Inspect)
1st St. Residual
p-val: 1st St. Resid.
No. of Obs.

+/- 2 % Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-2.309
-1.290
(0.888)***
(0.664)*
NO
0.901
(0.109)***
NO
NO
N/A
N/A
853
817

+/- 1% Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-2.025
-1.905
(0.764)***
(0.314)***
NO
0.971
(0.167)***
NO
NO
N/A
0.424
403
376

Table 8. Local Linear Models of Inspections in Close Open Districts
(A) Probit Models of Inspections (Binary)
Marginal Effect (Clustered Standard Error)
Repub. Cong.
Dummy
Lag Inspect
First Stage
Residual
No. of Obs.

+/- 2.5 % Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-0.188
-0.613
(.2332)
(.1184)***
0.986
NO
(.0145)***
-1.539
NO
(.2796)***
1319
1161

+/- 2% Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-0.364
-0.869
(.3959)
(.1399)***
0.960
NO
(.0431)***
-1.207
NO
(.3287)***
820
713

(B) Poisson Models of Inspections (Count)
Coefficient (Clustered Standard Error)
Repub. Cong.
Dummy
Log (1 + Lag
Inspect)
1st St. Residual
p-val: 1st St. Resid.
No. of Obs.

+/- 2.5 % Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-1.493
-1.265
(.6684)**
(.4677)***
0.875
NO
(.0962)***
NO
NO
N/A
0.211
1351
1310

+/- 2% Close Open Data
Non-dynamic
Dynamic
-2.297
-2.066
(1.3473)*
(.8388)**
0.901
NO
(.1098)***
NO
NO
N/A
0.678
853
817

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, robust clustered at the Congressional District. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%. All models include all controls; State, year and industry effects. Table 8 models include the Republican vote margin
(v) and its interaction with the Congressional dummy (v*C). The dynamic Probit models include the lag of inspections
(binary), treated as endogenous (using 2SRI). In the dynamic Poisson models, we treat the (log of one plus) inspection lag as
exogenous because first stage residuals are not significant (and the Table 7B 2% 2SRI did not converge).
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Table 9. Control Function Models of Inspections in Open Seat Districts
Probit Models of Inspections (Binary)
Marginal Effect (Clustered Std. Error)
Polynomials in Vote
Share
Repub. Cong, Dum.
ME/Coeff

Polynomials in Vote
Share
Repub. Cong. Dum.
ME/Coeff

Polynomials in Vote
Share
Repub. Cong. Dum.
ME/Coeff

Polynomials in Vote
Share
Repub. Cong. Dum.
ME/Coeff
First Stage Residual
p-value on test for
exogeneity of lag

Polynomials in Vote
Share
Controls
Repub. Cong. Dum.
ME/Coeff

3

4

-0.081
(0.0424)*

-0.078
(0.0424)*

3

4

-0.094
(0.0433)**

-0.093
(0.0433)**

3

4

-0.082
(0.0456)*

-0.081
(0.0452)*

Poisson Models of Inspections (Count)
Coefficient (Clustered Std. Error)

Reduced Models +
5
3
-0.092
(0.0487)*

-0.159
(0.0881)*

Base Models ++
5
3
-0.102
(0.0496)**

-0.154
(0.0949)

Full Models +++
5
3
-0.066
(0.0534)

-0.246
(0.1195)**

Dynamic Base Models ++++
5
3

4

5

-0.149
(0.0935)

-0.080
(0.1002)

4

5

-0.152
(0.0982)

-0.078
(0.1061)

4

5

-0.248
(0.1181)**

-0.212
(0.1390)

4

5

3

4

-0.103
(0.0406)**
No

-0.106
(0.0395)***
No

-0.112
(0.0474)**
No

-0.088
(0.0781)
Yes

-0.088
(0.0781)
Yes

-0.064
(0.0915)
Yes

0.601

0.697

0.701

0.017

0.017

0.017

3

3

Base
-0.145
(0.1381)

Full
-0.187
(0.1810)

3

3

Reduced
-0.132
(0.0582)**

Base
-0.141
(0.0591)***

Ferreira / Gyourko Models +++++
3
3
Full
-0.083
(0.0650)

Reduced
-0.145
(0.1292)

Standard errors in parentheses, robust clustered at the Congressional District level. ***,**,* denote significance at the (two-sided) 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. In all models, data are for facilities in Congressional Districts that, in the prior year, had an open seat Congressional election in
which the top two vote getters were a Republican and a Democrat.
+ Reduced Models (non-dynamic) include the Republican Congressman Dummy; State effects; and polynomials in the vote share, s=R/(D+R) where
D=Democrat vote share, R=Republican vote share. No. of obs = 23525 for all models.
++ The Base Models (non-dynamic) include all controls except lagged release; State, year and industry effects; and polynomials in vote share. No. of
obs = 20380 (20399) for the Probit (Poisson) models.
+++ The Full Models (non-dynamic) include all controls; State, year and industry effects; and polynomials in vote share. No. of obs = 5601 (5632)
for the Probit (Poisson) models.
++++ The Dynamic Base Models include Base Model controls, the lagged inspection dummy (in the Probit) and lag of one plus lagged inspections
(in the Poisson). In the Probit models, we fail to reject the null of exogeneity of the lag and treat the lag as exogenous. In the Poisson models, we
reject the null of exogeneity of the lag and treat the lag as endogenous using 2SRI estimations (with lagged controls as instruments). No. of obs =
18354 (18379) in the Probit (Poisson) models.
+++++ The Ferreira/Gyourko models (non-dynamic) include Base Model controls; third order polynomials in vote margin (v=R-D) and its
interactions with the Republican Congressman dummy (C): v, vC, v2, v2C, v3, and v3C. No. of obs = 23807/20627/5601 (23807/20644/5632) for the
Reduced/Base/Full models of the Probit (Poisson).
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On-Line Appendix for “Parties, Politics & Regulation”
This Appendix sketches a theoretical model that gives rise to predictions for which we
test in our empirical paper (“Parties, Politics and Regulation: Do Republican
Congressmen Reduce Local Enforcement of Clean Air Laws?”). The model frames
bargaining between the EPA (the Environmental Protection Agency) and a legislative
body responsible for EPA budget decisions. The model simplifies and abstracts from
many realities of the actual bargaining environment in order to pinpoint how preferences
of individual Congressmen might affect on-the-ground regulatory choices. For example,
the model posits an explicit bargain between the EPA and individual Congressmen that
would be implicit and unenforceable in practice; this structure arguably captures the
repeated nature of politician-regulator interactions.
Agents. There are two types of agents: 1) the EPA (environmental regulator), and 2) N
individual Congressmen, each from one of two parties, R and D. From an environmental
point of view (to the EPA), the N districts to which the Congressmen belong are
identical. However, the Congressmen are not. We envision a single Congressional vote
(for example, the House initiating appropriations) and therefore (for simplicity) focus on
a single chamber of Congress.
Choices. Congress chooses the EPA’s budget, B (per district). The EPA allocates the
budget between enforcement and other activities (e.g., monitoring the environment,
providing environmental information, international environmental policy, etc.), and can
choose district-specific enforcement effort.

Congressional Preferences. Individual Congressmen have preferences over enforcement
in their own district, ei, and overall environmental policy, captured by B. Preferences of
Congressman i are given by
(A1)

Ui = U(B,ei;Bi*,ei*) = – θ (B-Bi*)2 – (1-θ) (ei-ei*)2,

where Bi* and ei* are bliss points. We assume (for simplicity) that the enforcement bliss
points are common within political parties, ei* = eD* for D’s and ei*=eR* for R’s. The
Bi* bliss points are Congressman-specific and distributed according to party-specific
distributions.
EPA Preferences. The EPA has increasing concave preferences over district-specific
enforcements and overall budget:
(A2)

UE* = Σi=1,..,N (1/N) UE(ei,B-eA)

where eA=average ei = (1/N) Σi=1,..,N ei.
Information. The bliss points eD* and eR* are known by the EPA. However, the EPA
only knows the distributions of individual Bi* bliss points (by virtue of party affiliation)
and not individual Member draws from this distribution. Note that this information
structure is in the interest of individual Congressmen in the bargaining environment
envisioned here; with perfect information about the Bi* preferences, the EPA has an
incentive to bargain only with marginal Congressional voters on its budget (those on the
margin between voting for and against the budget); the imperfect information modeled
here motivates bargaining with all Congressmen.
The Game. First, the EPA proposes a budget B and a menu of district-specific
enforcement intensities. We assume that the EPA adheres to the full proposal if its
budget is passed and does not condition its implementation of a district’s enforcement

intensity on the vote of the district’s Congressman, whether due to institutional/legal
constraints or private information about “votes” that are hidden in Congressional politics.
Second, Congress “votes” the EPA proposal up or down. Third, if the EPA proposal is
enacted, it is implemented as proposed. If the EPA proposal is voted down, then there is
reversion to a “status quo” budget B0, with the EPA freely choosing district enforcement
to maximize its utility. We take the status quo budget as given here; it could be the
outcome of a median Congressional voter model, for example. The “benchmark”
enforcement outcome maximizes the EPA utility as follows:
(A3)

e0 = argmaxe UE(e,B0-e)

The Voting Process. Each Congressperson i votes for the EPA budget if:
(A4)

payoff under EPA budget and enforcement commitment = Ui(B,ei;.)
> payoff under benchmark = Ui(B0,e0;.)

Given the party-specific probability distribution of bliss points Bi*, the probability that an
individual D Congressperson votes for the EPA budget with EPA enforcement
commitment ei is:
(A5)

qD(B,ei;B0) = Prob(U(B,ei;Bi*,eD*) > U(B0,e0;Bi*,eD*))
= Prob(Bi*>Bc: U(B,ei;Bc,eD*) = U(B0,e0;Bc,eD*)),

where the probabilities are determined by the D-specific distribution of Bi*. Likewise,
the probability that an individual R Congressperson votes for the EPA budget is
qR(B,ei;B0), determined by the R-specific distribution of Bi*.
The political constraint for passage of the EPA proposal is that weighted Congressional
votes surpass a passage threshold x<1 (fifty percent for example, x=.5):
Σ i=1,..,N δiαi ≥ x,

where δi = 1 (0) if Congressman i votes “yes” (“no”). Each Congressman has known
power αi in the voting process where Σ i=1,..,N αi = 1. For example, a Congressman who
chairs an EPA oversight appropriations subcommittee may have more “power” in the
voting process.
Due to the law of large numbers (with αi of order (1/N), N large), the political constraint
reduces to:
(PC)

Σ i=1,..,N E(δi)αi ≥ x

where E(δi)=qD(B,ei;B0) for D’s and E(δi)=qR(B,ei;B0) for R’s. In both cases, note that q
rises when ei is closer to a “bliss point,” thus relaxing the political constraint.
The EPA Choice Problem. This structure gives rise to the following EPA choice
problem:
(A6)

max B,{ei} Σ i=1,..,N (1/N) UE(ei,B-eA) s.t. (PC)

Implications. There are several implications of this problem and characterization of its
solution: (1) First, the political constraint (PC) binds. (If it didn’t, B could be elevated
marginally without violating the constraint, thereby increasing the EPA objective
function value and contradicting the premise of a solution to (A6).) (2) Second, in a
solution to (A6), B is larger than the “status quo” B0. (The EPA can always offer the
“status quo” menu of (B0,e0), which elicits a 100 percent favorable vote and, hence, a
slack (PC); with (PC) slack, the EPA can marginally increase B without violating the
constraint, again contradicting the premise of a solution to (A6).) This is the benefit to
the EPA of engaging in this bargaining game. (3) Third, the EPA’s ei enforcement
proposals will depart from the EPA’s preferred enforcement level e*(B) (=argmax U(e,Be)), toward eD and eR for D’s and R’s respectively, in order to relax the political

constraint (PC). (Marginal departures from e*(B) have negligible impact on the EPA
objective function, by the Envelope Theorem, but strictly positive impact on EPA welfare
by relaxing the (PC), given result (1).) The EPA can elevate B marginally in return for
enforcement “bribes” to the individual Congressmen. (4) Fourth and finally, the extent of
departure from e*(B) (and proximity to eD*/eR* bliss points) is greater for Congressmen
with higher power coefficients αi. (“Bribes” to higher αi Congressmen have greater
marginal benefit because they have a larger impact on the political constraint (PC).)
Result (3) is the key outcome for which we test in this paper. Given different
enforcement bliss points, eD* and eR*, result (3) implies that district-specific enforcement
outcomes can depend upon party affiliation. For example, suppose that eR*<e*(B)<eD*.
Then, in the solution to the EPA’s problem (A6), any Republican Congressman i and any
Democratic Congressman j will have enforcements that satisfy: eR*<ei<ej<eD*. That is,
districts with Republican Congressmen experience fewer inspections.

